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The Vietnam War and International Law
Volume 4: The Concluding Phase
Edited by Richard A. Falk; Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey; 1976; xiv and 1051 pp., (Index), $35.
Reviewed by ALWYN V. FREEMAN
This group of papers closes the series sponsored by the American Society of
International Law on the controversial legal issues which surfaced during the
war in Vietnam. The papers chosen for inclusion (most of which have been
published previously) were selected by the Civil War Panel of the Society.
Along with the contributions in the three earlier volumes they constitute what
appears to be a comprehensive and balanced assembly of the writings of
scholars, government officials and lawyers on the complex legal aspects of the
conflict. Not the least of the collection's merits is, of course, that it renders
accessible with a minimum of effort virtually all of the useful material bearing
upon the initiation, conduct and conclusion of one of America's sorriest
episodes. The war spilled a considerable amount of blood. It also was respon-
sible for spilling more ink in a shorter period than any other major war in
American history.
Volume 4, which focuses on the final stage of the American war effort in
Indo-China, is divided into five major topics, with papers on (1) The Role of
International Law and Organization; (2) Laws of War, including repatriation
of prisoners of war presenting a stimulating exchange between Richard Falk
and Howard Levie (one of the world's great authorities on prisoners of war);
(3) War Crimes and Individual Responsibility (with a devastating rebuttal by
Waldemar Solf of Telford Taylor's curiously uninformed attempt to equate
Vietnam and Nuremburg); (4) the settlement of the war and (5) its domestic
aftermath in the United States in the constitutional sphere of war-making. A
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handy appendix reproduces documents containing agreements on the settle-
ment of the war, principal judicial decisions and the legislative action in the
United States on war-related issues (such as Holtzman v. Schlesinger, Mottola
v. Nixon, Orlando v. Laird and the War Powers Resolution). Finally, a special
supplement treats the resumption of hostilities by Hanoi and the defeat of the
South, with the diplomatic notes and executive statements pertaining thereto,
along with several papers commenting upon the finale.
Like its predecessors, the papers in Volume 4 represent a massive intellectual
effort. As scholarly studies they are of an uneven quality, which might be an-
ticipated in a work of this magnitude. Some few are transparently partisan
pleadings, reflecting a slant which is not cured by a pseudo-objective scholar-
ship. Here one can detect slightly more than a propaganda effort, cloaked in
the raiment of juridical dialectic. Happily, there is more than the indispensable
share of sound scientific analysis relating to the countless legal issues provoked
by the war, to enable newcomers to this jousting pit to reach their own conclu-
sions as to whether the United States effort in Vietnam was immoral, illegal
and contrary to everything in this nation's history (adjectives earlier used by
the French communists when France was fighting the Viet Minh); or whether it
was grounded on the solid legal principles, consistent with the rationale of the
Southeast Asia Treaty and inspired by this country's desire to support and de-
fend the independence of a small State under siege by a kin neighbor but-
tressed by the two leading communist powers.
Unfortunately, the volume was produced prior to the revealing memoirs of
Van Dong which confirmed what many pro-Western observers had fruitlessly
insisted: that the Viet Cong were not really a spontaneous, indigenous revolu-
tionary group struggling to overthrow the Diem regime; but that, in truth they
were the creation and the stooge of North Vietnam, and promptly disappeared
from the stage when Saigon was defeated; that the terrorist tactics designed to
destroy the fabric of village leadership in the South originated in Hanoi; that
the Cong had been organized as a technique to dissimulate the nature of the
conflict so as to make it look like something different from the bald aggression
which the North had planned for years against the South. All of which leaves
those who trumpeted that the United States was interfering in a bona fide civil
war with some highly rancid egg on their faces, and possibly, just possibly,
with a slight twinge of conscience at the degree to which their actions may have
prolonged the conflict, multiplied its victims by the thousands and effectively
contributed to the success of the enemy's war effort. Yet, is there any doubt
that the misguided apologists for Hanoi would have sung a wholly different
tune during that war had the enemy borne the swastika of the NSDAP instead
of the hammer and sickle of the Soviet CCCP? In that hypothesis one can rest
assured that the entire balance of the literature addressing problems discussed
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in this series on Vietnam would have tilted in a different direction.
One of the most original contributions in the volume is Robert W. Tucker's
scholarly postlude on Vietnam, The Final Reckoning (at p. 1011), which is no
less disturbing, or perhaps the most disturbing, because the author sees the
d6nouement of that tragedy as a vindication of the position of all those who
opposed United States intervention from the beginning:
[A]merican involvement in Vietnam represented, more than anything else, the
triumph of an expansionist and imperial interest which by the 1960s had submerged
the narrower and more conventional security interest the policy of containment in-
itially expressed. Without question, the involvement in Vietnam was also a legacy of
the classic cold war, of the momentum generated by the cold war ... Vietnam was
perceived as a threat to this larger interest, and it was the preservation of this larger
interest-an imperial interest-that must ultimately explain Vietnam. In the purpose
of maintaining a particular vision of world order, in the equation of this order with
American security ... and in the reluctance to withdraw from a conflict that could
not be "won" without resort to odious measures, Vietnam affords a classic case of
an imperial war. [Italics supplied.]
Other observers may have some difficulty accepting so neat and bland a
characterization, given the realities of Soviet expansionist policies either in
today's world, or in the world of Vietnam. A primary objective of that policy
is the relentless exclusion of the United States and the West from strategic
areas of this planet, a policy in which the USSR has been doing quite well,
thank you. Now, it is not terribly naive or simplistic to regard Indo-China as
representing such an area, nor the Persian Gulf, nor the Mediterranean, nor
Angola, nor the critically strategic sea-lane control routes around South
Africa. Of course, the United States has a choice: we can recline indolently on
our diplomatic fundament and hope that the USSR trips on its face as it did in
Egypt, with all the risks that entails; or we can adopt a policy to meet this
gathering menace to our survival. If we have such a policy it is too dimly im-
plemented to have any substance. High-sounding moralisms are not a policy;
despite our pre-World War II antipathy toward the Soviet Union, we
overlooked its tyranny, its suppression of human rights and its then muted
dedication to our own destruction when we joined with it against what we
perceived to be a worse tyranny. The highest respect for our own future in-
dependence may well justify a comparable alignment with certain other friend-
ly nations whose domestic policies may be abhorrent to the American people.
For us to contribute to the destruction of these nations may well be tanta-
mount to cutting our own throats.
If these strictures have any merit, then Professor Tucker's evaluation would
evidence that the worst legacy of the Vietnam war on the part of Tucker and
other commentators, is that they have drawn all the wrong conclusions from
that war; and this failure to draw the proper lessons may well prove fatal to the
United States in the years to come. To Tucker's credit, however, part of this
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has not escaped his concern:
[I]t is in the excess of Vietnam that we may find a root cause-perhaps the root
cause-of an outlook today that promises to be as indiscriminate in its anti-
interventionism as was the interventionism of only yesterday. If some of the now visi-
ble consequences of this sudden change are to be deplored, this consideration cannot
alter the judgment rendered on our involvement in Vietnam.
What puzzles this reviewer is the failure of any of the writers in the collec-
tion to come to grips with what thus far has seemed to be an untouchable ques-
tion, but one which should have impelled a congressional inquiry long ago: the
extent to which public opinion (including that of legal writers) was molded and
manipulated by the communist propaganda apparatus through the media, the
universities and the churches, to a degree which gives cause for worry whether
this nation could ever wage an effective war against a communist aggressor.
For many of the criminal practices by our adversary which would have
been-and were-condemned out of hand when indulged in by the Nazi and
Fascist belligerents in World War II, were either ignored completely or quickly
found accommodating sympathizers in this nation. Hanoi's military power did
not defeat the United States, although Clausewitz must have turned in his
grave witnessing our inane concentration upon the tentacles of the octopus.
The debacle was due as much to Hanoi's brilliant leveraging against us of the
diplomatic, political and informational vehicles we freely placed at its
disposal, as to our own ineptness and our belated appreciation that much of
our immense firepower had been directed towards the wrong targets.
It would have been most helpful, also, in this final volume, if one or more of
the contributors had entered upon a comparison of our struggle in Vietnam
with the Peloponnesian Wars (as recorded by Thucydides), from the stand-
point of campaigns which failed because they lost the support of the people
back home; and, even more to the point, the congeries of reasons-some of
which have been alluded to in this review-why the military in Vietnam lost
that support. Perhaps such an inquiry may yet be pursued. He who embarks
upon it, along with all members of the profession, must remain forever
grateful for the ready assistance which this monumental collection of sources
offers on the disaster in Vietnam.
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International Law for General Practitioners
Prepared for the State Bar of Texas Institute, State Bar of Texas
Headquarters, 1977; 267 pp., $30.
Reviewed by ALWYN V. FREEMAN
The immediate reaction of anyone who thumbs through the papers collected
in the present volume must surely be, "Why hasn't this sort of thing been done
before?" What the State Bar of Texas has done is to put together an indispens-
able vade mecum for the practicing lawyer of the most useful suggestions this
reviewer has seen on how to go about handling the practical legal problems
arising in international business operations. Most general practitioners who
are confronted with a trans-national legal situation simply do not know how to
begin; although possibly cognizant of the theoretical and academic parameters
of an issue, they may have so loose an awareness of the true nature of a given
problem that their approach may be ineffective, costly, or, worse, prejudicial
to their client. Nor may it be sufficient to avoid pitfalls merely to be able to
consult foreign legal talent to act on one's behalf, as this volume clearly at-
tests.
Prompted by the growing international business in Texas, to which an in-
creasing number of lawyers in the state were being exposed in real estate, cor-
porations and general practice, the Texas Bar sponsored a one-day institute in
international law in Houston on September 30, 1977, for which these papers
were designed. The two sessions of the meeting featured lectures and discus-
sions in the general areas of representation of corporate clients abroad, and of
foreign investors in the United States. Overviews of these two fields were given
by Ewell Murphy (a past chairman of the Section) and Burnell Goodrich,
whose topics dealt, respectively, with (a) certain special factors to be con-
sidered in representing clients abroad (such as finding foreign law, choosing
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and motivating foreign counsel and typical tax structures for foreign opera-
tions); and (b) branch and subsidiary organization in the United States, the
regulation of foreign investment and import regulations. Mr. Murphy's paper
offers an illuminating warning that "there is no such thing as foreign
counsel," emphasizing the importance of not asking the wrong first questions
either of a client or of the foreign lawyer whose services are enlisted. Mr.
Michael Owen provides an excellent introduction to export sales with sugges-
tions on the role of the lawyer, sources of information in locating export
markets and customers, export financing techniques and insurance and the
DISC as a tax deferred device which was in jeopardy at the time the paper was
delivered.
Jon Bauman's article treats the problem of international distributorship and
sales representation contracts for selling products abroad, with a practical
checklist of elements which must not be overlooked; while John Lynch's
''outline summary" complements this by examining the problem of licensing a
client's products abroad. The inevitable and all-important topic of United
States income taxation of foreign corporations and non-resident aliens, along
with gift and estate taxation and tax treaties, is 'the subject of Duncan
Osborne's paper. Structuring real estate investments in the United States for
foreign clients receives a simplified, but adequate examination by Edward
Hartline, from the standpoint of the tax consequences of such investments.
Finally, the troublesome problem of how to bring foreign investors and
foreign personnel of United States companies into the United States under
both immigrant and nonimmigrant classifications, is dealt with by Charles
Foster, with some practical advice for both alien and employer clients on im-
migration matters.
Not only the uninitiated but the experienced professional will find much to
cherish in this volume, whose insights are not readily acquired in practice ex-
cept after much trial and error. This reviewer's enthusiastic recommendation
to those engaged in the private practice of international law is to run, not walk,
to the nearest postal repository with their checks. It could be the most produc-
tive $30 publication they ever acquired.
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